@j178/prek-darwin-x64
Native darwin x64 binary for prek.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher is GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance attestation; automated CI/CD publishing is the intended pattern for this package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific binary distribution package; bundled binary is the entire purpose of this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Binary-only sub-package legitimately has no deps, minimal README, and no keywords. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.3.13 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.3.12 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.3.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.3.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.3.9 | 0 / 0 |
v0.4.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.11
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • prek
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.