@jackchuka/mdschema-darwin-arm64
mdschema pre-built binary for macOS ARM64 (Apple Silicon)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing is consistent with SLSA provenance attestation; not a compromise signal. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific prebuilt binary package; SLSA provenance attestation confirms CI/CD build integrity. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.13.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.13.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.12.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.12.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.13.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.10
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/mdschema
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.9
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/mdschema
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.