@jadenrazo/llm-lint-win32-x64
llm-lint binary for win32 x64.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform binary distribution package; .exe is the intended deliverable, backed by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Binary sub-package pattern legitimately has no deps, minimal README, and no keywords. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.3.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/llm-lint.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/llm-lint.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/llm-lint.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/llm-lint.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/llm-lint.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.