@joint/layout-directed-graph
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established JointJS monorepo package; lack of Sigstore provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.3.0 | 3 / 15 | |
| 4.2.5 | 3 / 15 | |
| 4.2.3 | 3 / 15 | |
| 4.2.2 | 3 / 16 | |
| 4.2.0 | 3 / 16 | |
| 4.1.4 | 3 / 13 | |
| 4.1.3 | 3 / 13 | |
| 4.1.1 | 3 / 13 | |
| 4.1.0 | 3 / 13 |
v4.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (joint_admin) than the most recent previously approved version (zbynekstara) on 2024-12-02, but joint_admin is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.