@journeyapps-labs/micro-codecs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Org-scoped package from established publisher; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/node | AI (phantom-deps): @types/node is a type-only dependency used at compile time; not directly imported at runtime is expected. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Scoped org package with clear naming; missing description is a style issue, not a security signal. | ai |
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.