@jup-ag/api
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:hapi | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @jup-ag/api for Jupiter DEX; Levenshtein match to 'hapi' is a false positive on the scoped name. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Same false positive pattern; no relation to 'pg'. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Same false positive pattern; no relation to 'joi'. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:ajv | AI (typosquat): Same false positive pattern; no relation to 'ajv'. | ai |
v6.0.48
2 findingsPackage name '@jup-ag/api' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'hapi'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.0.42
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.39
2 findingsPackage name '@jup-ag/api' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'hapi'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.