@jupyter/ydoc
Jupyter document structures for collaborative editing using YJS
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Metadata-only issue; publisher is a known Jupyter maintainer with clean history. No code changes in this version. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Informational; many legitimate packages lack Sigstore provenance. Not a security risk for this established package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from jupyter-server-release-bot to GitHub Actions is a CI bot migration within the Jupyter org, confirmed by SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Inflated semver, short README, and no keywords are all expected for an official Jupyter scoped package migrated/extracted from a monorepo. Not indicative of spam or malice. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@jupyterlab/nbformat | AI (dependencies): Official JupyterLab package for notebook format definitions; expected dependency for a Jupyter document library. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:yjs | AI (dependencies): yjs is a well-known CRDT library; a core dependency of @jupyter/ydoc by design. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:y-protocols | AI (dependencies): y-protocols is the standard companion to yjs; legitimate and expected dependency. | ai |
Versions (showing 40 of 40)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.4.1 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.4.0 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.3.6 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.3.5 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.3.4 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.3.3 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.3.2 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.3.1 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.3.0 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.2.1 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.2.0 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.1.0 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.0.5 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.0.4 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.0.3 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.0.2 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.0.1 | 6 / 13 | |
| 3.0.0 | 6 / 13 | |
| 2.1.5 | 6 / 13 | |
| 2.1.4 | 6 / 13 | |
| 2.1.3 | 6 / 13 | |
| 2.1.2 | 6 / 13 | |
| 2.1.1 | 6 / 13 | |
| 2.1.0 | 6 / 13 | |
| 2.0.1 | 6 / 13 | |
| 2.0.0 | 6 / 13 | |
| 1.1.1 | 6 / 13 | |
| 1.1.0 | 6 / 13 | |
| 1.0.2 | 6 / 13 | |
| 1.0.1 | 6 / 13 | |
| 1.0.0 | 6 / 13 | |
| 0.3.4 | 6 / 14 | |
| 0.3.3 | 6 / 14 | |
| 0.3.2 | 6 / 14 | |
| 0.3.1 | 6 / 14 | |
| 0.3.0 | 6 / 14 | |
| 0.2.5 | 6 / 11 | |
| 0.2.4 | 6 / 11 | |
| 0.2.3 | 6 / 11 | |
| 0.2.2 | 6 / 11 |
v3.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: davidbrochart.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-09-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.1.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: fcollonval.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-09-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: fcollonval.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: fcollonval.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: fcollonval.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-03-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.3.4
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: fcollonval.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-02-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.3.3
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: davidbrochart.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-02-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.3.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: davidbrochart.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.5
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: fcollonval.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-07-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.2.4
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: fcollonval.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-04-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.2.3
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: fcollonval.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.