@jupyterlab/apputils
JupyterLab - Application Utilities
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@jupyterlab/coreutils | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope (@jupyterlab); likely used indirectly or re-exported. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/sanitize-html | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only dependency used at compile time, not directly imported at runtime; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@types/sanitize-html | AI (dependencies): @types/sanitize-html is a TypeScript type definition package for the already-declared sanitize-html runtime dep; its presence as a dependency is a benign early-TypeScript pattern for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): jtpio is a well-known JupyterLab core contributor with 1696 approved packages; publisher change from jasongrout is a legitimate project maintainer transition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers (krassowski, goanpeca, mbektas, loichuder) are known JupyterLab contributors; this is a normal team expansion for an active open-source project. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Missing gitHead is consistent with a CI/tooling change during maintainer transition; no malware indicators present. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:buffer | AI (phantom-deps): Buffer polyfill is a standard pattern for browser-targeting libraries; declared for build/bundler use. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Provenance is uncommon (12% adoption); not a material risk for established JupyterLab package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:url | AI (phantom-deps): url is a well-known Node.js URL polyfill; phantom detection in config files is a stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): Diff is cross-major-branch (3.x vs 4.x); added deps are well-known Lumino/React packages consistent with JupyterLab 3.x dependency surface. Not a suspicious addition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): JupyterLab uses a centralized release bot (jupyterlab-release-bot) for publishing; individual maintainer removals are expected organizational changes, not takeover indicators. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@jupyterlab/services | AI (dependencies): First-party JupyterLab package from the same monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@jupyterlab/coreutils | AI (dependencies): First-party JupyterLab package from the same monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@jupyterlab/observables | AI (dependencies): First-party JupyterLab package from the same monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@jupyterlab/translation | AI (dependencies): First-party JupyterLab package from the same monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@jupyterlab/ui-components | AI (dependencies): First-party JupyterLab package from the same monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@jupyterlab/settingregistry | AI (dependencies): First-party JupyterLab package from the same monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@jupyterlab/rendermime-interfaces | AI (dependencies): First-party JupyterLab package from the same monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@jupyterlab/statusbar | AI (dependencies): First-party JupyterLab package from the same monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lumino/widgets | AI (dependencies): First-party Lumino package from the JupyterLab ecosystem monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lumino/commands | AI (dependencies): First-party Lumino package from the JupyterLab ecosystem monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lumino/domutils | AI (dependencies): First-party Lumino package from the JupyterLab ecosystem monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lumino/algorithm | AI (dependencies): First-party Lumino package from the JupyterLab ecosystem monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lumino/coreutils | AI (dependencies): First-party Lumino package from the JupyterLab ecosystem monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lumino/messaging | AI (dependencies): First-party Lumino package from the JupyterLab ecosystem monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lumino/signaling | AI (dependencies): First-party Lumino package from the JupyterLab ecosystem monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lumino/disposable | AI (dependencies): First-party Lumino package from the JupyterLab ecosystem monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lumino/virtualdom | AI (dependencies): First-party Lumino package from the JupyterLab ecosystem monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@jupyterlab/statedb | AI (dependencies): First-party JupyterLab package from the same monorepo; stable long-term dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:sanitize-html | AI (dependencies): sanitize-html is a well-known HTML sanitization library; its use in a JupyterLab UI utilities package is legitimate and expected. No advisories affect the pinned range. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): JupyterLab monorepo packages always publish at coordinated high semver versions and have minimal sub-package READMEs. These signals are structural false positives for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/react | AI (phantom-deps): @types/react is intentionally listed as a runtime dep in JupyterLab packages for type-sharing conventions; not a security concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 100 of 212)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.7.2 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.7.1 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.7.0 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.6.10 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.6.9 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.6.8 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.6.7 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.6.6 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.6.5 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.6.4 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.6.3 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.6.2 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.6.1 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.6.0 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.5.10 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.5.9 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.5.8 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.5.7 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.5.6 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.5.5 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.5.4 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.5.3 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.5.2 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.5.1 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.5.0 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.4.8 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.4.7 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.4.6 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.4.5 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.4.4 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.4.3 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.4.2 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.4.1 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.4.0 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.3.7 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.3.6 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.3.5 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.3.4 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.3.3 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.3.2 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.3.1 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.3.0 | 21 / 6 | |
| 4.2.8 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.2.7 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.2.6 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.2.5 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.2.4 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.2.3 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.2.2 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.2.1 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.2.0 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.1.13 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.1.12 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.1.11 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.1.10 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.1.9 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.1.8 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.1.7 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.1.6 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.1.5 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.1.4 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.1.3 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.1.2 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.1.1 | 21 / 7 | |
| 4.0.0 | 21 / 7 | |
| 3.6.8 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.6.7 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.6.6 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.6.5 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.6.4 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.6.3 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.6.2 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.6.1 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.6.0 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.5.3 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.5.2 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.5.1 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.5.0 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.4.8 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.4.7 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.4.6 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.4.5 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.4.4 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.4.3 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.4.2 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.4.1 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.4.0 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.3.4 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.3.3 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.3.2 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.3.1 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.3.0 | 23 / 9 | |
| 3.2.9 | 22 / 9 | |
| 3.2.8 | 22 / 9 | |
| 3.2.7 | 22 / 9 | |
| 3.2.6 | 22 / 9 | |
| 3.2.5 | 22 / 9 | |
| 3.2.4 | 22 / 9 | |
| 3.2.3 | 22 / 9 | |
| 3.2.2 | 22 / 9 |
v4.7.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.6
3 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.6.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.6.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.8
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jupyterlab-release-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (fcollonval) on 2023-11-02, but jupyterlab-release-bot is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.1.7
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jupyterlab-release-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (fcollonval) on 2023-10-11, but jupyterlab-release-bot is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jupyterlab-release-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (echarles) on 2023-08-03, but jupyterlab-release-bot is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.1.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jupyterlab-release-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (echarles) on 2023-07-13, but jupyterlab-release-bot is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jupyterlab-release-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (fcollonval) on 2023-05-30, but jupyterlab-release-bot is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.0.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jupyterlab-release-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (fcollonval) on 2023-05-15, but jupyterlab-release-bot is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.6.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.6.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.6.6
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (fcollonval) than the most recent previously approved version (jupyterlab-release-bot) on 2023-09-26, but fcollonval is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.6.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (echarles) than the most recent previously approved version (jupyterlab-release-bot) on 2023-06-26, but echarles is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.6.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (fcollonval) than the most recent previously approved version (jtpio) on 2022-12-19, but fcollonval is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.5.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (fcollonval) than the most recent previously approved version (jtpio) on 2022-12-05, but fcollonval is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.5.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jtpio) than the most recent previously approved version (fcollonval) on 2022-10-24, but jtpio is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.4.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (fcollonval) than the most recent previously approved version (jtpio) on 2022-08-10, but fcollonval is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.4.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (fcollonval) than the most recent previously approved version (ajbozarth) on 2022-07-21, but fcollonval is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.4.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jtpio) than the most recent previously approved version (echarles) on 2022-06-07, but jtpio is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.4.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (ajbozarth) than the most recent previously approved version (fcollonval) on 2022-05-13, but ajbozarth is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.4.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (echarles) than the most recent previously approved version (fcollonval) on 2022-05-12, but echarles is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.4.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (fcollonval) than the most recent previously approved version (echarles) on 2022-05-03, but fcollonval is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.3.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (fcollonval) than the most recent previously approved version (echarles) on 2022-04-15, but fcollonval is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.3.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (echarles) than the most recent previously approved version (jasongrout) on 2022-04-07, but echarles is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.3.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (fcollonval) than the most recent previously approved version (jasongrout) on 2022-03-14, but fcollonval is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.3.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jasongrout) than the most recent previously approved version (jtpio) on 2022-03-10, but jasongrout is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jtpio) than the most recent previously approved version (blink1073) on 2021-12-10, but jtpio is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.2.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (blink1073) than the most recent previously approved version (jasongrout) on 2021-11-17, but blink1073 is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.2.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jasongrout) than the most recent previously approved version (blink1073) on 2021-11-11, but jasongrout is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.2.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: blink1073.