@jupyterlab/audio-extension
JupyterLab - Audio File Viewer Extension
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): JupyterLab migrated CI publishing from jupyterlab-release-bot to GitHub Actions; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate org-controlled pipeline. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): rrosio is a known JupyterLab contributor; addition consistent with org maintainer management. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Official JupyterLab sub-package; sparse README and no keywords are expected for internal extension packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.5.8 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.5.7 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.5.6 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.5.5 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.5.4 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.5.3 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.5.2 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.5.1 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.5.0 | 6 / 6 |
v4.5.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.