@jupyterlab/docprovider
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): jtpio is a trusted JupyterLab core contributor with 3657 approved packages; missing gitHead reflects a CI/CD config change, not a supply chain compromise. Stable accept for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Lack of Sigstore provenance is a best-practice gap, not a security blocker. Package has strong ecosystem trust and no other indicators of compromise. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): krassowski is a known JupyterLab core contributor; addition is a legitimate team expansion for this official JupyterLab package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:lib0 | AI (dependencies): lib0 is a core dependency of the Yjs ecosystem; its use here alongside yjs and y-websocket is expected and consistent across all versions of this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): jupyterlab-release-bot is the official JupyterLab CI/CD release automation account; transition from individual maintainer to release bot is expected and legitimate for this org. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:y-protocols | AI (phantom-deps): y-protocols is a legitimate runtime dependency for collaborative editing; declared in package.json dependencies and used transitively. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): 3.6.x is a maintenance branch; long gaps between patch releases are normal. SLSA provenance confirms release via official CI pipeline. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 55)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.6.8 | 10 / 6 | |
| 3.6.7 | 10 / 6 | |
| 3.6.6 | 10 / 6 | |
| 3.6.5 | 10 / 6 | |
| 3.6.4 | 10 / 6 | |
| 3.6.3 | 10 / 6 | |
| 3.6.2 | 10 / 6 | |
| 3.6.1 | 9 / 6 | |
| 3.6.0 | 9 / 6 | |
| 3.5.3 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.5.2 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.5.1 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.5.0 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.4.8 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.4.7 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.4.6 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.4.5 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.4.4 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.4.3 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.4.2 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.4.1 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.4.0 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.3.4 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.3.3 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.3.2 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.3.1 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.3.0 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.2.9 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.2.8 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.2.7 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.2.6 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.2.5 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.2.4 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.2.3 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.2.2 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.2.1 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.2.0 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.1.18 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.1.17 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.1.16 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.1.15 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.1.13 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.1.12 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.1.11 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.1.10 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.1.9 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.1.8 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.1.7 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.1.6 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.1.5 | 5 / 6 | |
| 3.1.4 | 5 / 6 |
v3.6.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-08-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.6.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.6
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-09-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.6.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-06-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.6.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-05-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.6.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-10-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.4.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.7
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-09-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.4.6
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-09-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.4.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-08-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.4.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-07-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.4.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-06-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.4.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.4.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.4.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-05-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.3.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.3.3
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.3.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-03-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.3.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.3.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jtpio.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.8
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jtpio.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-01-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.7
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.6
3 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jtpio.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-01-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.5
3 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jtpio.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-12-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: blink1073.
v3.2.3
3 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jasongrout.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-11-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: blink1073.
v3.2.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: blink1073.
v3.2.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: blink1073.
v3.1.18
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.1.17
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: blink1073.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.16
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: blink1073.
v3.1.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.13
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: blink1073.
v3.1.12
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: blink1073.
v3.1.11
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: blink1073.
v3.1.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.