@jupyterlab/rendermime-interfaces
JupyterLab - Interfaces for Mime Renderers
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Missing gitHead is consistent with the switch to jupyterlab-release-bot CI/CD pipeline; no malicious indicators present. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): JupyterLab transitioned to a release-bot model; new maintainers are known JupyterLab contributors/infrastructure. This pattern is stable for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Large maintainer removal reflects JupyterLab's documented transition to release-bot automation. Historical contributors stepping back is expected and stable for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): JupyterLab migrated from jupyterlab-release-bot to GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance attestation — a legitimate and more secure CI/CD publishing transition for this well-established package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lumino/widgets | AI (dependencies): Core Lumino dependency within JupyterLab ecosystem; unvetted status is acceptable for established transitive dependencies. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lumino/coreutils | AI (dependencies): Core Lumino dependency within JupyterLab ecosystem; unvetted status is acceptable for established transitive dependencies. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Well-known JupyterLab sub-package with 82.7k weekly downloads; README and keyword signals are false positives for this scoped interface package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 161)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.13.7 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.13.6 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.13.5 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.13.4 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.13.3 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.13.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.13.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.13.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.12.10 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.12.9 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.12.8 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.12.7 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.12.6 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.12.5 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.12.4 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.12.3 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.12.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.12.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.12.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.11.8 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.11.7 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.11.6 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.11.5 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.11.4 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.11.3 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.11.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.11.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.11.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.10.7 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.10.6 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.10.5 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.10.4 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.10.3 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.10.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.10.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.10.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.9.8 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.9.7 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.9.6 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.9.5 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.9.4 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.9.3 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.9.2 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.9.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.9.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.8.13 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.8.12 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.8.11 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.8.10 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.8.9 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.8.8 | 2 / 3 |
v3.13.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.6
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jupyterlab-release-bot.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-04-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.9.5
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jupyterlab-release-bot.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-03-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.9.4
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jupyterlab-release-bot.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-03-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.9.3
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jupyterlab-release-bot.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.9.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jupyterlab-release-bot.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-02-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.9.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jupyterlab-release-bot.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.9.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jupyterlab-release-bot.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.8.13
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jupyterlab-release-bot.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.8.12
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jupyterlab-release-bot.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.8.11
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jupyterlab-release-bot.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-01-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.8.10
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jupyterlab-release-bot.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-12-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.8.9
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jupyterlab-release-bot.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-11-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.8.8
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: jupyterlab-release-bot.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-11-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.