@juzi/wechaty-puppet-rabbit
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@juzi/wechaty | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dependency; internal package structure. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@juzi/wechaty-puppet-rabbit | AI (phantom-deps): Self-referential scoped dep; internal package structure. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal scoped package; missing metadata is typical for org-internal libraries. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; legitimate supply chain improvement for this package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Established scoped package in @juzi org; missing description is a style issue, not a risk signal. | ai |
Versions (showing 24 of 24)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.46 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.45 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.44 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.43 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.42 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.41 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.40 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.39 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.38 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.37 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.36 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.35 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.34 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.33 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.32 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.31 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.0.30 | 6 / 4 | |
| 1.0.29 | 6 / 4 | |
| 1.0.28 | 6 / 4 | |
| 1.0.27 | 7 / 4 | |
| 1.0.26 | 7 / 4 | |
| 1.0.25 | 7 / 4 | |
| 1.0.24 | 7 / 4 | |
| 1.0.23 | 7 / 4 |
v1.0.45
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.44
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.43
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.42
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.41
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.40
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.39
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.38
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.37
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.36
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.35
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.34
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.31
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.27
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.26
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.