@keeper-security/secrets-manager-core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Standard base64 utility in a secrets manager SDK; not a payload-hiding pattern. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 17.5.0 | 0 / 15 | |
| 17.4.0 | 0 / 15 | |
| 17.3.0 | 0 / 15 | |
| 17.2.0 | 0 / 14 | |
| 17.1.0 | 0 / 14 | |
| 17.0.0 | 0 / 14 |
v17.5.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (sec_manager) on 2026-07-01, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v17.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.