@kenjiuno/msgreader
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@kenjiuno/decompressrtf | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dependency; declared in package.json and used in compiled output. Not a phantom dep risk for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package with 101 versions and clean history; lack of provenance attestation is not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.28.0 | 2 / 8 | |
| 1.27.0 | 2 / 8 | |
| 1.26.0 | 2 / 8 | |
| 1.24.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 1.23.0 | 2 / 7 |
v1.28.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.27.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.26.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.24.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.23.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.