@keplr-wallet/stores
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation from official chainapsis repo; legitimate CI/CD migration. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Package has 1003 versions and 10 approved-dep edges; dormancy flag is a false positive for this actively maintained package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Base64 decoding is used for cryptographic signature handling in a wallet library; stable pattern across versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:eventemitter3 | AI (phantom-deps): eventemitter3 is a declared runtime dependency; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 114)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.13.37 | 15 / 1 | |
| 0.13.36 | 15 / 1 | |
| 0.13.35 | 15 / 1 | |
| 0.13.34 | 15 / 1 | |
| 0.13.33 | 15 / 1 | |
| 0.13.32 | 15 / 1 | |
| 0.13.31 | 15 / 1 | |
| 0.13.30 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.28 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.27 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.26 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.24 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.23 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.22 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.21 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.20 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.19 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.18 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.17 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.16 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.15 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.14 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.13 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.12 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.11 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.10 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.9 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.8 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.7 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.6 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.5 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.4 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.3 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.2 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.1 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.13.0 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.12.313 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.12.312 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.12.311 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.12.310 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.12.309 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.12.308 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.12.307 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.12.306 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.12.305 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.12.304 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.12.300 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.12.299 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.12.298 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.12.297 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.12.296 | 14 / 1 |
v0.13.37
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.36
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.35
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.34
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.31
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.30
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.24
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.23
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.22
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.313
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.312
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.311
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.310
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.309
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.308
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.307
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.306
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.305
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.304
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.300
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.299
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.298
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.297
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.296
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.