@keystonehq/keystone-sdk
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Established SDK package; sparse README/keywords are typical for this org's packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common; no other risk signals elevate this. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.12.2 | 25 / 16 | |
| 0.12.1 | 25 / 16 | |
| 0.12.0 | 25 / 16 | |
| 0.11.7 | 25 / 16 | |
| 0.11.6 | 25 / 16 | |
| 0.11.5 | 24 / 16 | |
| 0.11.4 | 24 / 16 | |
| 0.11.3 | 24 / 16 | |
| 0.11.2 | 24 / 16 | |
| 0.11.1 | 24 / 16 | |
| 0.11.0 | 24 / 16 | |
| 0.10.1 | 23 / 16 |
v0.12.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (keystoneorg) than the most recent previously approved version (soralit) on 2026-06-04, but keystoneorg is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.11.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.10.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.