@keyvhq/multi
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
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Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established publisher; no provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1.15 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.1.13 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.1.11 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.1.7 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.1.5 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.1.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.0.3 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 6 |
v2.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.