@khanacademy/wonder-blocks-button
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Khan Academy migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; this is a legitimate infra change for the monorepo. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by CI-attested publish from the official Khan/wonder-blocks repo; consistent with a tooling migration, not a takeover. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@khanacademy/wonder-blocks-tokens | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling dep; stable pattern across all wonder-blocks packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@khanacademy/wonder-blocks-clickable | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling dep; stable pattern across all wonder-blocks packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@khanacademy/wonder-blocks-icon | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling dep; stable pattern across all wonder-blocks packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@khanacademy/wonder-blocks-progress-spinner | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling dep; stable pattern across all wonder-blocks packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@khanacademy/wonder-blocks-typography | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling dep; stable pattern across all wonder-blocks packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@khanacademy/wonder-blocks-styles | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling dep; stable pattern across all wonder-blocks packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 34 of 34)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.6.2 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.6.1 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.6.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.5.4 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.5.3 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.5.2 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.5.1 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.5.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.4.2 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.4.1 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.4.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.3.4 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.3.3 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.3.2 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.3.1 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.3.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.2.11 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.2.10 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.2.9 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.2.8 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.2.7 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.2.6 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.2.5 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.2.4 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.2.3 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.2.2 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.2.1 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.2.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.1.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.0.4 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.0.3 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.0.2 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.0.1 | 7 / 1 | |
| 11.0.0 | 7 / 1 |
v11.6.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.5.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.5.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.4.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.3.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.3.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.3.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.