@khanacademy/wonder-blocks-cell
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Khan Academy migrated to GitHub Actions publishing with SLSA attestation; change is org-wide and intentional. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy consistent with org-wide CI migration; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate publish pipeline. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@khanacademy/wonder-blocks-styles | AI (dependencies): Internal sibling dep from the same Khan Academy wonder-blocks monorepo; stable false positive. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@khanacademy/wonder-blocks-tokens | AI (dependencies): Internal sibling dep from the same Khan Academy wonder-blocks monorepo; stable false positive. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@khanacademy/wonder-blocks-clickable | AI (dependencies): Internal sibling dep from the same Khan Academy wonder-blocks monorepo; stable false positive. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@khanacademy/wonder-blocks-typography | AI (dependencies): Internal sibling dep from the same Khan Academy wonder-blocks monorepo; stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.2.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.2.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.2.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.15 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.14 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.13 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.12 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.11 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.10 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.9 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.8 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.7 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.6 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.5 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.4 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.1.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.0.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 6.0.0 | 5 / 1 |
v6.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.