@kinem/svelte
Svelte bindings for kinem
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; consistent with legitimate automation setup. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase reflects Rollup bundling dist output; no injected payload indicators. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.4.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 4 |
v0.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.