@krakenjs/belter
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Standard base64 decode utility in src/util.js; no obfuscation or exfiltration pattern present. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.9.3 | 3 / 16 | |
| 2.9.2 | 3 / 16 | |
| 2.9.1 | 3 / 15 | |
| 2.9.0 | 3 / 15 |
v2.9.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.9.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.9.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.