@ktav-lang/js-linux-arm64-gnu
Universal JS/TS bindings for Ktav — a plain configuration format with three rules, zero indentation, and zero quoting. WASM-backed, ships for Node, Deno, Bun, and browsers from a single package.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binding package; .node + .so files are the expected deliverable, backed by SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): No-dep, sparse-README pattern is normal for a platform-specific sub-package in a multi-package native binding setup. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.1.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • ktav.linux-arm64-gnu.node • libktav_cabi.so
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • ktav.linux-arm64-gnu.node • libktav_cabi.so
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.