@kurrent/kapacitor-linux-arm64
kapacitor native binary for Linux ARM64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI/CD is a legitimate and expected workflow change, backed by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific binary package; bundled binary is the entire purpose of this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): No repo/keywords/deps is expected for a platform-specific binary distribution package in a scoped namespace. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 91)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.14 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.13 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.12 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.3.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.3.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.16 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.15 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.14 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.13 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.12 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.52 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.51 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.50 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.49 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.48 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.47 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.46 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.45 | 0 / 0 |
v0.5.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.10
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.9
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.16
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.15
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.14
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.13
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.11
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.10
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.9
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.8
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.52
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.51
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.50
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.49
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.48
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.47
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.46
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.45
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.