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@kurrent/kapacitor-linux-musl-x64

kapacitor native binary for Linux musl x64 (Alpine)

51
Versions
UNLICENSED
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

georgepaynealexeyzimarevsergio.silveiraw1amwilliamkurrent

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions is a legitimate CI/CD automation pattern, confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation. ai
npm-metadata bundled-binaries AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific binary distribution package; bundled native binary is the entire purpose of this package. ai
bogus-package bogus-package AI (bogus-package): Minimal platform-specific optional dep package; no repo/keywords/deps is normal for this pattern. ai

Versions (showing 51 of 88)

View all versions
Version Deps Published
0.5.14 0 / 0
0.5.13 0 / 0
0.5.12 0 / 0
0.5.11 0 / 0
0.5.10 0 / 0
0.5.9 0 / 0
0.5.8 0 / 0
0.5.7 0 / 0
0.5.6 0 / 0
0.5.5 0 / 0
0.5.4 0 / 0
0.5.2 0 / 0
0.5.1 0 / 0
0.5.0 0 / 0
0.4.10 0 / 0
0.4.9 0 / 0
0.4.7 0 / 0
0.4.6 0 / 0
0.4.5 0 / 0
0.4.4 0 / 0
0.4.3 0 / 0
0.4.2 0 / 0
0.4.1 0 / 0
0.4.0 0 / 0
0.3.2 0 / 0
0.3.1 0 / 0
0.3.0 0 / 0
0.2.16 0 / 0
0.2.15 0 / 0
0.2.14 0 / 0
0.2.13 0 / 0
0.2.12 0 / 0
0.2.11 0 / 0
0.2.10 0 / 0
0.2.9 0 / 0
0.2.8 0 / 0
0.2.7 0 / 0
0.2.5 0 / 0
0.2.4 0 / 0
0.2.3 0 / 0
0.2.2 0 / 0
0.2.1 0 / 0
0.2.0 0 / 0
0.1.52 0 / 0
0.1.51 0 / 0
0.1.50 0 / 0
0.1.49 0 / 0
0.1.48 0 / 0
0.1.47 0 / 0
0.1.46 0 / 0
0.1.45 0 / 0

v0.5.14

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.13

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.12

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.11

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.10

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.9

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.8

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.7

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.6

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.5

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: w1am → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-24) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: w1am → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.5.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.5.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.4.10

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (2) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.4.9

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (2) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.4.7

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (2) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.4.6

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (2) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.4.5

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (2) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.4.4

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (2) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.4.3

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (2) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.4.2

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (2) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.4.1

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (2) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.4.0

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (2) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.3.2

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (2) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.3.1

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (2) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.3.0

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (2) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor • bin/kapacitor-daemon

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.16

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.15

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.14

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.13

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.11

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.10

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.9

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.8

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.7

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.5

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.4

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.3

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.2

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.1

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.0

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.52

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.51

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.50

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.49

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.48

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.47

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.46

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.45

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/kapacitor

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.