@lage-run/rpc
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Scoped Microsoft package; name similarity to 'pg' is coincidental, not impersonation. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.6 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.4.5 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.4.4 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.4.3 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.4.2 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.4.1 | 5 / 4 |
v1.4.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.