@lage-run/runners
Runners for Lage
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions with valid SLSA/Sigstore attestation — this is a legitimate CI/CD migration for a Microsoft OSS monorepo package, not a compromise. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Task runner intentionally passes process.env to child processes to run npm scripts — this is core, expected behavior for a build tool runner. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): NpmScriptRunner.js exists specifically to spawn npm scripts via child_process — this is the package's documented, primary function. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal monorepo package from microsoft/lage; documentation lives on the project site, not in the package README. Not a spam/bogus signal. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.9 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.4.8 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.4.7 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.4.6 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.4.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.4.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.4.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.4.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.4.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.4.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.3.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.3.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.2.7 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.2.6 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.2.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.2.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.2.3 | 1 / 1 |
v1.4.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.8
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/microsoft/lage/blob/7545a88821578ba3f270aa779e6f89d8a2180053/lib/NpmScriptRunner.js#L112 110 | shell: true 111 | }, > 112 | env: { 113 | ...process.stdout.isTTY && { 114 | FORCE_COLOR: "1"
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.