@lage-run/scheduler-types
Scheduler types for Lage
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from personal Microsoft employee account to GitHub Actions CI/CD is intentional and backed by SLSA provenance attestation from the microsoft/lage repo. Stable for this package going forward. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lage-run/target-graph | AI (dependencies): @lage-run/target-graph is a sibling package in the same Microsoft lage monorepo — a trusted intra-monorepo dependency, not a third-party risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.7 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.4.6 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.4.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.4.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.4.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.4.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.4.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.4.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.3.32 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.3.31 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.3.30 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.3.29 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.3.28 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.3.27 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.3.26 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.3.25 | 1 / 1 |
v0.4.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.26
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.