@langchain/core @0.0.11

[Always reject] CVSS 8.6 (HIGH) — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N ## Context A serialization injection vulnerability exists in LangChain JS's `toJSON()` method (and subsequently when string-ifying objects using `JSON.stringify()`. The method did not escape objects with `'lc'` keys when serializing free-form data in kwargs. The `'lc'` key is used internally by LangChain to mark serialized objects. When user-controlled data contains this key structure, it is treated as a legitimate LangChain object during deserialization rather than plain user data. ### Attack surface The core vulnerability was in `Serializable.toJSON()`: this method failed to escape user-controlled objects containing `'lc'` keys within kwargs (e.g., `additional_kwargs`, `metadata`, `response_metadata`). When this unescaped data was later deserialized via `load()`, the injected structures were treated as legitimate LangChain objects rather than plain user data. This escaping bug enabled several attack vectors: 1. **Injection via user data**: Malicious LangChain object structures could be injected through user-controlled fields like `metadata`, `additional_kwargs`, or `response_metadata` 2. **Secret extraction**: Injected secret structures could extract environment variables when `secretsFromEnv` was enabled (which had no explicit default, effectively defaulting to `true` behavior) 3. **Class instantiation via import maps**: Injected constructor structures could instantiate any class available in the provided import maps with attacker-controlled parameters **Note on import maps:** Classes must be explicitly included in import maps to be instantiatable. The core import map includes standard types (messages, prompts, documents), and users can extend this via `importMap` and `optionalImportsMap` options. This architecture naturally limits the attack surface—an `allowedObjects` parameter is not necessary because users control which classes are available through the import maps they provide. **Security hardening:** This patch fixes the escaping bug in `toJSON()` and introduces new restrictive defaults in `load()`: `secretsFromEnv` now explicitly defaults to `false`, and a `maxDepth` parameter protects against DoS via deeply nested structures. JSDoc security warnings have been added to all import map options. ## Who is affected? Applications are vulnerable if they: 1. **Serialize untrusted data via `JSON.stringify()` on Serializable objects, then deserialize with `load()`** — Trusting your own serialization output makes you vulnerable if user-controlled data (e.g., from LLM responses, metadata fields, or user inputs) contains `'lc'` key structures. 2. **Deserialize untrusted data with `load()`** — Directly deserializing untrusted data that may contain injected `'lc'` structures. 3. **Use LangGraph checkpoints** — Checkpoint serialization/deserialization paths may be affected. The most common attack vector is through **LLM response fields** like `additional_kwargs` or `response_metadata`, which can be controlled via prompt injection and then serialized/deserialized in streaming operations. ## Impact Attackers who control serialized data can extract environment variable secrets by injecting `{"lc": 1, "type": "secret", "id": ["ENV_VAR"]}` to load environment variables during deserialization (when `secretsFromEnv: true`). They can also instantiate classes with controlled parameters by injecting constructor structures to instantiate any class within the provided import maps with attacker-controlled parameters, potentially triggering side effects such as network calls or file operations. Key severity factors: - Affects the serialization path—applications trusting their own serialization output are vulnerable - Enables secret extraction when combined with `secretsFromEnv: true` - LLM responses in `additional_kwargs` can be controlled via prompt injection ## Exploit example ```typescript import { load } from "@langchain/core/load"; // Attacker injects secret structure into user-controlled data const attackerPayload = JSON.stringify({ user_data: { lc: 1, type: "secret", id: ["OPENAI_API_KEY"], }, }); process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY = "sk-secret-key-12345"; // With secretsFromEnv: true, the secret is extracted const deserialized = await load(attackerPayload, { secretsFromEnv: true }); console.log(deserialized.user_data); // "sk-secret-key-12345" - SECRET LEAKED! ``` ## Security hardening changes This patch introduces the following changes to `load()`: 1. **`secretsFromEnv` default changed to `false`**: Disables automatic secret loading from environment variables. Secrets not found in `secretsMap` now throw an error instead of being loaded from `process.env`. This fail-safe behavior ensures missing secrets are caught immediately rather than silently continuing with `null`. 2. **New `maxDepth` parameter** (defaults to `50`): Protects against denial-of-service attacks via deeply nested JSON structures that could cause stack overflow. 3. **Escape mechanism in `toJSON()`**: User-controlled objects containing `'lc'` keys are now wrapped in `{"__lc_escaped__": {...}}` during serialization and unwrapped as plain data during deserialization. 4. **JSDoc security warnings**: All import map options (`importMap`, `optionalImportsMap`, `optionalImportEntrypoints`) now include security warnings about never populating them from user input. ## Migration guide ### No changes needed for most users If you're deserializing standard LangChain types (messages, documents, prompts) using the core import map, your code will work without changes: ```typescript import { load } from "@langchain/core/load"; // Works with default settings const obj = await load(serializedData); ``` ### For secrets from environment `secretsFromEnv` now defaults to `false`, and missing secrets throw an error. If you need to load secrets: ```typescript import { load } from "@langchain/core/load"; // Provide secrets explicitly (recommended) const obj = await load(serializedData, { secretsMap: { OPENAI_API_KEY: process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY }, }); // Or explicitly opt-in to load from env (only use with trusted data) const obj = await load(serializedData, { secretsFromEnv: true }); ``` > **Warning:** Only enable `secretsFromEnv` if you trust the serialized data. Untrusted data could extract any environment variable. > **Note:** If a secret reference is encountered but not found in `secretsMap` (and `secretsFromEnv` is `false` or the secret is not in the environment), an error is thrown. This fail-safe behavior ensures you're aware of missing secrets rather than silently receiving `null` values. ### For deeply nested structures If you have legitimate deeply nested data that exceeds the default depth limit of 50: ```typescript import { load } from "@langchain/core/load"; const obj = await load(serializedData, { maxDepth: 100 }); ``` ### For custom import maps If you provide custom import maps, ensure they only contain trusted modules: ```typescript import { load } from "@langchain/core/load"; import * as myModule from "./my-trusted-module"; // GOOD - explicitly include only trusted modules const obj = await load(serializedData, { importMap: { my_module: myModule }, }); // BAD - never populate from user input const obj = await load(serializedData, { importMap: userProvidedImports, // DANGEROUS! }); ```

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