@langchain/langgraph
LangGraph
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:langchain | AI (phantom-deps): Langchain is a core dependency re-exported by this wrapper; phantom-dep pattern is expected for orchestration libraries. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:zod | AI (phantom-deps): Zod is a direct dependency used in type validation; phantom-dep pattern is expected for schema libraries in wrapper packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@langchain/community | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dependency used in examples/config; phantom-dep pattern is expected in monorepo-style ecosystems. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@langchain/openai | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dependency used in examples/config; phantom-dep pattern is expected in monorepo-style ecosystems. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:double-ended-queue | AI (dependencies): double-ended-queue is a well-known, stable utility package with no security concerns; safe for use as a dependency in this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@langchain/langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the same LangChain/LangGraph monorepo, published by the same trusted maintainer team. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): davidduong is a known LangChain team publisher (714 days, 207 approved). Legitimate maintainer rotation within the langchain-ai org. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established LangChain package; lack of Sigstore provenance is a known gap for this package family, not a security indicator. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/hash.js | AI (source-diff): The long hex string is the well-known XXH3 secret key constant, used by the xxHash hashing algorithm implementation. This is a legitimate cryptographic constant, not a malicious payload. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/hash.cjs | AI (source-diff): The long hex string is the XXH3 hashing algorithm's secret/seed constant — a standard cryptographic constant used in the XXH3 implementation. Not a malicious payload. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @standard-schema/spec is a legitimate, widely-used schema interface package pinned to 1.1.0; consistent with LangGraph's schema validation support direction. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Package has SLSA provenance attestation via Sigstore, which is a stronger integrity signal. Missing gitHead reflects a CI pipeline change, not a malicious publish. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer change is within the langchain-ai org; hntrl is a known LangChain contributor. Legitimate transition, not a takeover. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): benjamincburns removal is part of a legitimate org-level maintainer transition within langchain-ai. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@langchain/langgraph-sdk | AI (dependencies): First-party LangChain sibling package published by the same org; expected dependency for langgraph ecosystem packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@langchain/langgraph-checkpoint | AI (dependencies): First-party LangChain sibling package published by the same org; expected dependency for langgraph ecosystem packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 171)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.0 | 5 / 26 | |
| 1.2.9 | 4 / 26 | |
| 1.2.8 | 4 / 26 | |
| 1.2.7 | 4 / 26 | |
| 1.2.6 | 4 / 35 | |
| 1.2.5 | 4 / 35 | |
| 1.2.4 | 4 / 35 | |
| 1.2.3 | 4 / 35 | |
| 1.2.2 | 4 / 35 | |
| 1.2.1 | 4 / 35 | |
| 1.2.0 | 4 / 35 | |
| 1.1.5 | 4 / 35 | |
| 1.1.4 | 4 / 35 | |
| 1.1.3 | 4 / 35 | |
| 1.1.2 | 4 / 35 | |
| 1.1.1 | 3 / 36 | |
| 1.1.0 | 3 / 36 | |
| 1.0.15 | 3 / 35 | |
| 1.0.14 | 3 / 35 | |
| 1.0.13 | 3 / 37 | |
| 1.0.12 | 3 / 37 | |
| 1.0.7 | 3 / 37 | |
| 1.0.6 | 3 / 37 | |
| 1.0.5 | 3 / 37 | |
| 1.0.4 | 3 / 37 | |
| 1.0.3 | 3 / 37 | |
| 1.0.2 | 3 / 37 | |
| 1.0.1 | 3 / 37 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 37 | |
| 0.4.9 | 4 / 38 | |
| 0.4.8 | 4 / 38 | |
| 0.4.7 | 4 / 38 | |
| 0.4.6 | 4 / 38 | |
| 0.4.5 | 4 / 38 | |
| 0.4.4 | 4 / 38 | |
| 0.4.3 | 4 / 38 | |
| 0.4.2 | 4 / 38 | |
| 0.4.1 | 4 / 38 | |
| 0.4.0 | 4 / 38 | |
| 0.3.12 | 4 / 37 | |
| 0.3.11 | 4 / 37 | |
| 0.3.10 | 4 / 37 | |
| 0.3.9 | 4 / 37 | |
| 0.3.8 | 4 / 37 | |
| 0.3.7 | 4 / 37 | |
| 0.3.6 | 4 / 36 | |
| 0.3.5 | 4 / 36 | |
| 0.3.4 | 4 / 36 | |
| 0.3.3 | 4 / 36 | |
| 0.3.2 | 4 / 36 | |
| 0.3.1 | 4 / 36 |
v1.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v1.2.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v1.2.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v1.2.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v1.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v1.1.2
3 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v1.1.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v1.1.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v1.0.15
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v1.0.14
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v1.0.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.