@langchain/langgraph-checkpoint
Library with base interfaces for LangGraph checkpoint savers.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): langchain-security is an org-internal maintainer addition for the @langchain scope. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): davidduong is an established LangChain ecosystem publisher with 1160-day history; transition from nfcampos appears to be a legitimate org-level maintainer change for the langgraphjs repo. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is a standard monorepo placeholder version in the LangChain ecosystem; package has 25 registry versions and 3 approved dependents, confirming legitimacy. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): LangChain packages in this ecosystem consistently publish without Sigstore provenance; this is a stable pattern across all versions and not a risk indicator for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 24 of 24)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 9 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 18 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 18 | |
| 0.1.1 | 1 / 19 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 19 | |
| 0.0.18 | 1 / 26 | |
| 0.0.17 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.16 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.15 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.14 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.13 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.12 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.11 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.10 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.9 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.8 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.7 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.6 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.5 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.4 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.2 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 25 | |
| 0.0.0 | 1 / 25 |
v1.0.2
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-12-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-11-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-09-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.