@langchain/openai
OpenAI integrations for LangChain.js
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Alpha pre-release with restructured build pipeline; missing gitHead is a process artifact, not a supply chain indicator. Package metadata and repo URL are consistent with the official LangChain org. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Major version restructuring (0.6.9 → 1.0.0-alpha.1) naturally introduces many new source files; new large files are source maps, expected build artifacts. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is a standard monorepo placeholder version for the LangChain.js workspace; not indicative of malicious intent for this well-established package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed from human (hntrl) to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance — a deliberate supply chain security improvement for the langchain-ai org, not a compromise. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers (andy-langchain, rcasup) are LangChain org members; addition is consistent with normal team growth at an active organization. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of nfcampos alongside CI/CD migration is consistent with legitimate maintainer roster changes at the langchain-ai org. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 159)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.5 | 3 / 14 | |
| 1.4.4 | 3 / 15 | |
| 1.4.3 | 3 / 15 | |
| 1.4.2 | 3 / 15 | |
| 1.4.1 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.4.0 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.3.1 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.3.0 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.2.13 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.2.12 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.2.11 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.2.10 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.2.9 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.2.8 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.2.7 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.2.6 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.2.5 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.2.4 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.2.3 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.2.2 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.2.1 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.2.0 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.1.3 | 3 / 16 | |
| 1.1.2 | 3 / 16 | |
| 1.1.1 | 3 / 16 | |
| 1.1.0 | 3 / 16 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 16 | |
| 0.6.16 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.15 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.14 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.13 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.12 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.11 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.10 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.9 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.8 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.7 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.6 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.5 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.4 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.3 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.2 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.1 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.6.0 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.5.18 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.5.17 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.5.16 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.5.15 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.5.14 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.5.13 | 3 / 22 | |
| 0.5.12 | 4 / 22 |
v1.4.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.15
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.6.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.8
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.6.7
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.6.6
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.6.5
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.6.4
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.6.3
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.6.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.6.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.6.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.5.18
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.5.17
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.5.16
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.5.15
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.5.14
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.5.13
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.5.12
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.