@launchql/types
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Minimal types utility in a large established monorepo; sparse metadata is expected for this package type. | ai | |
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:dan lynch | AI (email-domain): Author field uses name string as email placeholder; no real domain to hijack. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): child_process used in CLI/build tooling (launchql.js); consistent with package purpose, not malicious. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:deepmerge | AI (phantom-deps): deepmerge is listed as a runtime dependency in package.json; phantom-dep heuristic false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 45 of 45)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.12.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.12.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.12.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.12.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.10.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.10.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.9.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.8.7 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.8.6 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.8.5 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.8.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.8.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.8.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.8.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.7.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.7.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.7.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.6.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.6.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.6.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.6.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.5.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.4.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.2.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.1.13 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.1.12 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.11 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.10 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.9 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.8 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.7 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.6 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.0.7 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.0.6 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.0.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.0.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.0.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.0.2 | 3 / 0 |
v2.12.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.12.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.12.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.12.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.10.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.10.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.8.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.8.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.8.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.8.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.8.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.8.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.7.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.7.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.6.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.6.2
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.6.1
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.6.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.5.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.13
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.12
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.11
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.10
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.9
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.8
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.7
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.6
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.5
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.4
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.3
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.2
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.1
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.7
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.6
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.5
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.4
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.3
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.2
2 findingsMaintainer email 'Dan Lynch' uses domain 'dan lynch' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.