@learncard/chapi-plugin
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Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publisher is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; stable pattern for this org going forward. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:web-credential-handler | AI (dependencies): Expected runtime dep for a CHAPI plugin; stable across versions of this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:credential-handler-polyfill | AI (dependencies): Expected runtime dep for a CHAPI plugin; stable across versions of this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Legitimate monorepo plugin from Learning Economy Foundation; README links are docs references, not a phishing link farm. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:web-credential-handler | AI (phantom-deps): CHAPI plugin; dependency is referenced in config/build rather than direct import — expected for this plugin type. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:credential-handler-polyfill | AI (phantom-deps): Polyfill loaded via config/build pipeline, not direct import — stable pattern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 42 of 42)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.21 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.1.20 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.1.19 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.1.18 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.1.17 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.1.16 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.1.14 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.1.13 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.1.12 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.1.9 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.1.8 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.1.7 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.1.6 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.1.4 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.1.2 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.1.1 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.79 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.78 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.77 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.76 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.75 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.74 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.73 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.72 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.71 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.70 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.69 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.68 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.67 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.65 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.64 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.63 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.62 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.61 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.60 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.59 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.58 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.57 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.56 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.55 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.54 | 4 / 10 | |
| 1.0.53 | 4 / 10 |
v1.1.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.79
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.78
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.77
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.76
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.75
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.74
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.73
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.72
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.71
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.70
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.69
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.68
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.67
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.65
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.64
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.63
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.62
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.61
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.60
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.59
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.58
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.57
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.56
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.55
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.54
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.53
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.