@learncard/core
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Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing backed by SLSA/Sigstore attestation; stable for this org-managed package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Long-established package with no provenance history; absence is consistent across all prior versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:isomorphic-webcrypto | AI (dependencies): isomorphic-webcrypto is a known WebCrypto polyfill; stable legitimate use across versions of this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @learncard/core from established org; Levenshtein match to 'cors' is a false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:abort-controller | AI (phantom-deps): Polyfill dependency; may be used transitively or in config without direct import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@learncard/helpers | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling package; likely used in build artifacts or re-exported without direct import in analyzed source. | ai |
Versions (showing 35 of 35)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.4.21 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.4.20 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.4.19 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.4.18 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.4.17 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.4.16 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.4.14 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.4.13 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.4.12 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.4.9 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.4.8 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.4.7 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.4.6 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.4.4 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.4.2 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.4.1 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.44 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.43 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.42 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.41 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.40 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.39 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.38 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.37 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.36 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.35 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.33 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.32 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.31 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.30 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.29 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.28 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.27 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.26 | 4 / 12 | |
| 9.3.25 | 4 / 12 |
v9.4.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.4.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.4.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.4.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.4.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.4.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.4.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.4.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.4.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.4.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.4.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.4.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.4.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.4.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.3.44
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.3.43
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.42
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.41
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.40
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.39
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.38
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.37
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.36
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.35
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.33
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.32
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.31
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.30
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.29
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.28
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.3.27
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.3.26
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.3.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.