@learncard/didkey-plugin
[<img src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/2185016/190510561-294db809-09fd-4771-9749-6c0e0f4144fd.png" width="215"/>](https://learncard.com)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; legitimate automation handoff for this org. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-dropped | AI (source-diff): Size drop reflects CI/CD pipeline change shipping only dist artifacts; no malicious indicators present. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:hex-lite | AI (dependencies): hex-lite is a small hex utility; stable dependency in this package with no malicious indicators. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Monorepo plugin from established org; README and metadata style is consistent across the LearnCard package family. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:hex-lite | AI (phantom-deps): hex-lite is declared as a runtime dep; phantom-dep heuristic fires but it may be used indirectly via bundled dist. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 67)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.27 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.26 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.25 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.24 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.23 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.22 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.21 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.20 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.19 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.18 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.17 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.16 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.14 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.13 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.12 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.9 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.8 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.7 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.6 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.4 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.2 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.1.1 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.55 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.54 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.53 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.52 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.51 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.50 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.49 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.48 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.47 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.46 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.44 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.43 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.42 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.41 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.40 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.39 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.38 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.37 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.36 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.35 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.34 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.33 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.32 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.31 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.30 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.29 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.28 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.27 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.0.26 | 3 / 10 |
v1.1.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.24
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (taylorbeeston) on 2026-01-06, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.1.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (taylorbeeston) on 2025-12-19, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.0.35
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.34
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.31
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.27
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.26
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.