@learncard/didkit-plugin-node-linux-x64-gnu
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific N-API addon; .node binary is the sole deliverable, expected for this package type. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binary distribution package; no deps, minimal README, and no keywords are all expected for this pattern. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.18 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.17 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.16 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.15 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.14 | 0 / 0 |
v0.2.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.16
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • index.linux-x64-gnu.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.