@lemmaoracle/sdk
[](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@lemmaoracle/sdk) [](https://www.typescriptlang.org/)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): buffer is a well-known Node.js polyfill; addition is consistent with browser-compatibility needs of a crypto SDK. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:onnxruntime-node | AI (phantom-deps): onnxruntime-node is a peer/config-level dep for ONNX inference; not directly imported in user code is expected. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@docknetwork/crypto-wasm | AI (dependencies): Legitimate WASM crypto library from Dock.io; consistent with this SDK's ZK/credential use case. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): New SDK package; lack of provenance is common and not a security signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 26 of 26)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.32 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.0.31 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.0.30 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.0.29 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.0.27 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.0.26 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.0.24 | 8 / 8 | |
| 0.0.23 | 8 / 8 | |
| 0.0.22 | 8 / 8 | |
| 0.0.21 | 8 / 8 | |
| 0.0.17 | 8 / 8 | |
| 0.0.15 | 8 / 8 | |
| 0.0.14 | 8 / 8 | |
| 0.0.13 | 8 / 8 | |
| 0.0.12 | 8 / 8 | |
| 0.0.11 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.0.10 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.0.9 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.0.8 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.0.7 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.0.6 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.0.5 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.0.4 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.0.3 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.0.2 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.0.1 | 9 / 8 |
v0.0.32
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: aggre.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.31
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: aggre.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.30
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.29
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.27
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.26
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: aggre.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.14
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: aggre.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.