@lexbuild/mcp
Model Context Protocol server for LexBuild. Exposes U.S. legal sources to AI agents.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Missing gitHead is a side effect of the CI/CD pipeline change. SLSA provenance attestation provides a stronger cryptographic link to source than gitHead. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance attestation from the same repo. This reflects a legitimate one-time migration to automated CI/CD publishing, not a compromise. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:yup | AI (typosquat): @lexbuild/mcp is a scoped MCP server for legal tech; the Levenshtein match against 'yup' is a spurious false positive with no plausible impersonation intent. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.26.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 1.25.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 1.24.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 1.24.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 1.23.3 | 4 / 4 | |
| 1.23.2 | 4 / 4 | |
| 1.23.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 1.23.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 1.22.0 | 4 / 4 |
v1.26.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.25.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.24.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.24.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.23.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.23.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.23.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.23.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.22.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.