@lexical/hashtag
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@lexical/utils | AI (phantom-deps): @lexical/utils is a declared dep in same org scope; likely re-exported or used transitively. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/LexicalHashtag.dev.js | AI (source-diff): Standard build output for Lexical; long lines from Unicode regex, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/LexicalHashtag.prod.js | AI (source-diff): Normal minified production bundle for Lexical. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/LexicalHashtag.dev.mjs | AI (source-diff): Standard ESM build output; long lines from Unicode regex. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/LexicalHashtag.prod.mjs | AI (source-diff): Normal minified ESM production bundle for Lexical. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Established Facebook Lexical monorepo package; missing gitHead is a metadata omission with no code-level risk, consistent with a CI environment change rather than malicious activity. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Facebook/Meta Lexical monorepo package with 580 versions and 1500+ days of history; lack of Sigstore provenance is not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 121)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.48.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.47.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.46.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.45.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.44.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.43.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.42.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.41.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.40.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.39.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.38.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.38.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.38.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.37.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.36.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.36.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.36.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.35.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.34.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.33.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.33.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.32.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.32.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.31.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.31.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.31.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.30.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.29.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.28.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.27.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.27.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.27.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.26.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.25.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.24.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.23.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.23.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.22.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.21.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.20.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.20.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.20.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.19.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.18.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.17.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.17.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.16.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.16.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.15.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.14.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.14.4 | 2 / 0 |
v0.48.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.47.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.30.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.29.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.28.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.27.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.27.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.27.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.26.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.25.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.24.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (zurfyx) than the most recent previously approved version (acywatson) on 2025-02-07, but zurfyx is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.23.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.22.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.21.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.20.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.20.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.20.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.19.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.18.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.16.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.16.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.14.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.14.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.