@lexical/link
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:LexicalLink.prod.mjs | AI (source-diff): Minified prod bundle of first-party Lexical code, not obfuscation; stable across releases. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from individual publisher to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance; expected for facebook/lexical. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/LexicalLink.prod.js | AI (source-diff): Standard production minified bundle for this package; stable across versions. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/LexicalLink.prod.mjs | AI (source-diff): Standard production minified ESM bundle for this package; stable across versions. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Lexical monorepo package from Facebook; missing gitHead reflects a CI/publish environment change, not a security concern. No other risk signals present across versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Facebook/Meta Lexical monorepo package; lack of Sigstore attestation is a process gap, not a malicious indicator, and is stable context for this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pino | AI (typosquat): @lexical/link is a scoped package from Facebook's Lexical editor framework; the Levenshtein match against 'pino' is a superficial false positive with no meaningful relationship. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lexical/extension | AI (dependencies): @lexical/extension is a sibling package in the same Facebook Lexical framework, versioned in lockstep; expected internal dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lexical/utils | AI (dependencies): @lexical/utils is a sibling package in the same Facebook Lexical framework, versioned in lockstep; expected internal dependency. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 118)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.48.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.47.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.46.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.45.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.44.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.43.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.42.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.41.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.40.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.39.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.38.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.38.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.38.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.37.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.36.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.36.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.36.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.35.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.34.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.33.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.33.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.32.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.32.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.31.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.31.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.31.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.30.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.29.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.28.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.27.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.27.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.27.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.26.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.25.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.24.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.23.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.23.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.22.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.21.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.20.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.20.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.20.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.19.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.18.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.17.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.17.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.16.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.16.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.15.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.14.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.14.4 | 2 / 0 |
v0.48.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.47.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.30.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.29.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.28.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.27.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.27.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.27.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.26.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.25.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (zurfyx) than the most recent previously approved version (acywatson) on 2025-02-21, but zurfyx is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.24.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (zurfyx) than the most recent previously approved version (acywatson) on 2025-02-07, but zurfyx is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.23.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.22.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.21.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.20.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.20.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.20.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.19.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.18.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.16.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.16.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.15.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.14.5
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.14.4
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.