@lexical/mark
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/LexicalMark.prod.js | AI (source-diff): Standard minified production build output for this package; stable across versions. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Publish-environment change for a well-established Meta package; not a security signal. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Facebook/Lexical monorepo package; provenance attestation is a process improvement, not a security blocker for this well-known package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lexical/utils | AI (dependencies): @lexical/utils is a sibling package from the same Facebook/Meta Lexical monorepo, always published in lockstep at the same version. This finding is a stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 23 of 23)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.45.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.44.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.43.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.42.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.41.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.40.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.39.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.38.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.38.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.38.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.37.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.36.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.36.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.36.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.35.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.34.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.33.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.33.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.32.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.32.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.31.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.31.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.31.0 | 2 / 0 |
v0.45.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zurfyx.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.43.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.42.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zurfyx.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.41.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zurfyx.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.40.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zurfyx.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.39.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.38.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.38.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.38.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.37.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.36.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.36.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.36.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.35.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.34.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.33.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.33.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.32.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.32.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.31.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.31.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.31.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.