@lexical/table
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/LexicalTable.prod.js | AI (source-diff): Standard minified production bundle for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/LexicalTable.prod.mjs | AI (source-diff): Standard minified production ESM bundle for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): zurfyx (Gerard Rovira) is a known core Lexical/Meta maintainer; legitimate transition from etrepum within the same org. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Established Facebook/Meta Lexical package with clean diff vs prior version; missing gitHead reflects a publish environment change, not a security concern for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Lexical monorepo packages have never shipped with Sigstore provenance; this is consistent across all versions and not a security signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 23 of 23)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.45.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.44.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.43.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.42.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.41.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.40.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.39.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.38.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.38.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.38.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.37.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.36.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.36.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.36.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.35.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.34.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.33.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.33.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.32.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.32.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.31.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.31.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.31.0 | 3 / 0 |
v0.45.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.43.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.42.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zurfyx.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.41.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.40.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.39.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.38.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.38.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.38.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.37.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.36.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.36.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.36.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.35.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.34.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.33.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.33.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.32.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.32.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.31.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.31.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.31.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.