@lifi/sdk
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:bech32 | AI (phantom-deps): Declared but not directly imported; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 115)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.16.3 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.16.2 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.16.1 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.16.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.15.7 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.15.6 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.15.5 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.15.4 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.15.3 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.15.2 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.15.1 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.15.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.14.1 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.14.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.13.7 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.13.6 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.13.5 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.13.4 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.13.3 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.13.2 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.13.1 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.13.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.12.14 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.12.13 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.12.12 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.12.11 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.12.10 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.12.9 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.12.8 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.12.7 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.12.6 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.12.5 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.12.4 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.12.3 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.12.2 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.12.1 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.12.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.11.4 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.11.3 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.11.2 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.11.1 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.11.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.10.1 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.10.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.9.3 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.9.2 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.9.1 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.9.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.8.11 | 11 / 0 |
v4.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (lifi) on 2026-07-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.