@lightsparkdev/crypto-wasm
A shared library for crypto operations in Lightspark's SDKs.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is intentional CI/CD automation, backed by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:new-function-constructor | AI (semgrep): wasm-bindgen generated glue code; new Function() reconstructs wasm-exported JS functions, not user-controlled input. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): SDK sub-package from established Lightspark org; sparse README and no keywords are typical for auto-generated wasm packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@lightsparkdev/core | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org peer dependency; phantom-dep heuristic fires because it's not directly imported in wasm glue files. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.26 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.1.25 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.1.24 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.1.23 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.1.22 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.1.21 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.1.20 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.1.19 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.1.18 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.1.17 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.1.16 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.1.15 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.1.14 | 1 / 3 |
v0.1.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.25
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.24
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.23
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.