@lindorm/enigma
Argon2id password hashing for Node.js, plus a layered `Enigma` helper that combines HMAC signing, Argon2 hashing, and AES encryption into a single `hash` / `verify` / `assert` interface.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lindorm/aes | AI (dependencies): Internal @lindorm monorepo sibling dependency; consistent pattern across all @lindorm packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@lindorm/oct | AI (dependencies): Internal @lindorm monorepo sibling dependency; consistent pattern across all @lindorm packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all @lindorm/* packages; monorepo pattern without Sigstore attestation. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.2 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.3.1 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.2.19 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.2.18 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.2.17 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.2.16 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.2.15 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.2.14 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.2.13 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.2.12 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.2.11 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.2.10 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.2.9 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.2.8 | 5 / 0 |
v0.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.