@lionweb/utilities
LionWeb utilities
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established monorepo package; absence of provenance is consistent across all 120 versions and is low risk here. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.9.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.9.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.9.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.8.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.8.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.7.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.7.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.7.0 | 6 / 0 |
v0.9.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.7.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.