@liteforge/calendar
Full scheduling calendar with day/week/month/agenda views, drag & drop, resize, and resource columns.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common; no other risk signals present for this package. | ai |
v0.4.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'schildw3rk.dev' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'schildw3rk.dev' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'schildw3rk.dev' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'schildw3rk.dev' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.