@live-change/locale-settings-service
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Consistent across all live-change-stack service packages; not a malice indicator here. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance across the entire live-change-stack; stable pattern for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.9.209 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.208 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.207 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.206 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.205 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.204 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.167 | 2 / 0 |
v0.9.209
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.208
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.207
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.206
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.205
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.167
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.