@livekit/agents
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removals paired with additions on an active org package reflect normal team rotation, not a takeover. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): LiveKit org uses GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance; publisher=GitHub Actions is expected for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers have livekit-org handles; consistent with team growth on an active org package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:pino-pretty | AI (phantom-deps): pino-pretty is declared as a runtime dep and used as a pino transport; not directly imported in source is expected. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@opentelemetry/instrumentation-pino | AI (phantom-deps): OpenTelemetry packages loaded by convention/config; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Decodes audio data from WebSocket server events; not a payload loader. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@opentelemetry/exporter-logs-otlp-proto | AI (phantom-deps): OpenTelemetry packages loaded by convention/config; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect | AI (semgrep): Standard Proxy trap using Reflect.get; not obfuscation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/pidusage | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only package used at compile time; not directly imported at runtime. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@opentelemetry/core | AI (phantom-deps): OpenTelemetry packages loaded by convention/config; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 32 of 32)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.5 | 34 / 9 | |
| 1.4.4 | 33 / 9 | |
| 1.4.3 | 33 / 9 | |
| 1.4.2 | 33 / 9 | |
| 1.4.1 | 33 / 9 | |
| 1.4.0 | 33 / 9 | |
| 1.3.4 | 34 / 9 | |
| 1.3.3 | 34 / 9 | |
| 1.3.2 | 34 / 9 | |
| 1.3.0 | 34 / 9 | |
| 1.2.8 | 34 / 9 | |
| 1.2.7 | 34 / 9 | |
| 1.2.6 | 34 / 9 | |
| 1.2.5 | 34 / 9 | |
| 1.2.4 | 34 / 9 | |
| 1.1.0 | 17 / 7 | |
| 1.0.15 | 18 / 9 | |
| 1.0.14 | 19 / 8 | |
| 1.0.13 | 17 / 10 | |
| 1.0.12 | 17 / 7 | |
| 1.0.11 | 17 / 7 | |
| 1.0.10 | 17 / 7 | |
| 1.0.9 | 17 / 7 | |
| 1.0.8 | 17 / 7 | |
| 1.0.7 | 17 / 7 | |
| 1.0.6 | 16 / 7 | |
| 1.0.5 | 16 / 7 | |
| 1.0.4 | 16 / 7 | |
| 1.0.3 | 16 / 7 | |
| 1.0.2 | 16 / 7 | |
| 1.0.1 | 14 / 7 | |
| 1.0.0 | 14 / 7 |
v1.4.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.