@livekit/protocol
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): LiveKit migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; this is the expected new publisher for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Org-wide maintainer roster update for LiveKit; consistent with legitimate team expansion. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer removals are part of the same LiveKit org restructuring; no takeover indicators. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy explained by CI/CD pipeline migration; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate automated publish. | ai |
Versions (showing 32 of 32)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.46.6 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.46.5 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.46.4 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.46.3 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.46.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.46.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.45.8 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.45.7 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.45.6 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.45.5 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.45.4 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.45.3 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.45.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.45.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.45.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.44.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.44.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.43.4 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.43.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.43.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.43.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.42.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.42.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.42.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.41.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.40.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.39.3 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.39.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.39.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.39.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.38.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.37.1 | 1 / 4 |
v1.46.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.46.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.46.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.46.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.46.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.46.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.45.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.45.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.45.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.45.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.45.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.45.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.45.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.45.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.44.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.44.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.43.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.43.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.43.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.43.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.42.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.42.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.42.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.41.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.40.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.39.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.39.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.39.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.39.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.37.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.